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Experts, Judges, and
Commentators: The Underlying
Debate About an Expert's
Underlying Data
by Ronald L. Carlson*
I.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIALOGUE

Debate concerning the limits of judicial power over expert witnesses
remains active and in its early stages.1 Commentators charting the
course of judicial opinions observe that some of the modem regulatory
proposals have yet to enlist official adoption.2 Part of the problem may
relate to recognition of questions. Courts will adjudicate critical issues
only when they are made aware of them. The burden of calling
attention to an expert's flawed bases falls squarely on trial lawyers who
must make astute and incisive objections?

In this formative period of legal development important decisions will
be made. The future direction of courtroom control over the burgeoning

onslaught of expert opinion4 will be shaped in the years immediately

* Fuller E. Callaway Professor of Law, University of Georgia. Augustana College (B.A.,
1956); Northwestern University (J.D., 1959, Clarion De Witt Hardy Scholar); Georgetown
University (LL.M., 1961, E. Barrett Prettyman Fellow in Trial Advocacy).
1. It is significant that twenty years after the advent of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
some of the most profound issues relating to experts remain unanswered by the courts.
Professor Imwinkelried's article raises a number of these. See infra note 4.
2. JoAnne A. Epps, Clarifying the Meaning ofFederalRule ofEvidence 703, 36 B.C. L.
REv. 53, 64 (1994).
3. Ronald L. Carlson, Getting a Grip on Experts, 16 LITIGATION 36 (Summer 1990)
[hereinafter Carlson, Getting a Grip].
4. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Developing a Coherent Theory of the Structure of Federal
Rule of Evidence 703, 47 MERCER L. REV. 447 (1996) [hereinafter Imwinkelried,
Developing]. For other references to the proliferation of expert testimony, see Ronald L.
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ahead. For this reason, it is vital that the aforementioned debate
continue. Positions previously advanced need to be refined and
reiterated. Courts should be alerted to the issues. As judges become
aware of significant questions--questions which are sometimes subtly
lodged in the tangle of an appellate record-information about how to
resolve them needs to be readily at hand.
Into this uncertain world Professor Imwinkelried's article comes, and
it makes a worthwhile contribution. Imwinkelried's focus on Federal
Rule of Evidence 703 is rightly directed. That rule, like no other, will
control most of the future development of expert witness law. Rule 703
is at the core of significant inquiries which confront our courts. Can the
expert's proponent formally introduce the hearsay reports upon which an
expert relies to supply his courtroom opinion? Is a trial judge precluded
from testing the credibility of the underlying data the expert used to
reach her conclusions? Imwinkelried raises these questions, and they
will be the targets of this commentary as well.
II.

WIDE-OPEN ADMISSION OF JUNK CONCLUSIONS?,

Much expert testimony is sound, reliable, and deserving of serious
consideration by the trier of fact. For example, the DNA proof supplied
by Dr. Robin Cotton in the O.J. Simpson murder trial springs immediately to mind. On the other hand, in many courtroom situations the
expert's proof is simply bought and paid for. Trial lawyers see experts
in the latter category as a growing breed. Moreover, the phenomenon of
the "hired gun" expert is widely accepted as a regular, if unpleasant, fact
of life.
Some of the sting can be taken from the expert who prostitutes
himself. The damage inflicted by his flawed opinions can be marginalized by a carefully prepared and well-executed cross-examination. But
how much more dangerous does the "jukebox" expert-the one who will
resonate any tune for a fee-become when judicial controls are removed?
Consider the possibilities. A lawyer hires a willing expert, a medical
doctor, and hands him the reports of other doctors X, Y, and Z in a
personal injury case. The hired doctor reads the reports and feels he can
rely upon them. If the local court has adopted the rule of wide-open
introduction of an expert's foundation, the following scenario occurs. At
trial, as the hired doctor gets ready to give his opinion, he eagerly

Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REV. 577 (1986)
[hereinafter Carlson, Policing]; David L. Faigman, Struggling to Stop the Flood of
Unreliable Expert Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 877 (1992).

In his text, Peter Huber

asserted that much of this expert testimony is "junk science." PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
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admits that he relied upon the reports of X, Y, and Z to reach certain
conclusions. The courtroom doctor presents his own conclusions,
whereupon the proponent next moves that the reports of X, Y, and Z be
received. The trial judge agrees. This accomplished, the "outside"
reports are then tossed into the lap of the jury. An enterprising attorney
has thus produced four experts for the price of one, with three of them
insulated from cross-examination in the bargain.
In an era of ambitious and compliant experts, protective rules are
needed to curb real and potential abuses. That is why some courts
announce the following doctrine, in essence: The data upon which an
expert says he relies are not admissible and may only be referred to in
a summary manner on direct examination.5 Underlying hearsay reports
are not to be read in detail to the jury, nor are copies to be marked and
published as exhibits.
A number of tribunals have recognized the need for such a rule.
Courts in Florida," Texas,' and California,' some of our largest states,
follow it. Judicial decisions or statutes in places like Massachusetts,'
New Jersey," Virginia," and Minnesota 12 embrace the wisdom of
this approach. Vermont elevated it to constitutional status in criminal
cases. 13 Thus, while most jurisdictions do not appear to have directly
faced this critical issue, many which have done so adopt an exclusionary
rule. 4 An exclusionary approach has also been embraced in a number
of federal decisions. 15

5. Imwinkelried, Developing, supra note 4, at 462, 470.
6. State v. Williams, 549 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
7. Beavers v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 821 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Ct. App.
1991); First S.W. Lloyds Ins. Co. v. MacDowell, 769 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
. 8. People v. Campos, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113 (1995); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174
Cal. Rptr. 348, 369 (1981). See People v. Nicolaus, 817 P.2d 893, 910 (Cal. 1991);
Continental Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1989), modified
on other grounds, 264 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1990).
9. Grant v. Lewis/Boyle, Inc., 557 N.E.2d 1136 (Mass. 1990); Commonwealth v.
Kendall, 399 N.E.2d 1115 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980). See Department of Youth Servs. v. A
Juvenile, 499 N.E.2d 812, 821 (Mass. 1986).
10. Hartman v. Yawger, 514 A.2d 545, 549 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986).
11. McMunn v. Tatum, 379 S.E.2d 908 (Va. 1989).
12. MINN. R. EviD. 703(b).
13. State v. Towne, 453 A.2d 1133 (Vt. 1982).
14. Slaaten v. Amerada Hess Corp., 459 N.W.2d 765, 767-68 (N.D. 1990); State v.
Weber, 496 N.W.2d 762 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). Kentucky has enacted a statute directed at
this problem. KY. R. EVID. 703(b). So has Louisiana. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 705 (West
1995).
15. Gong v. Hirsch, 913 F.2d 1269, 1273 (7th Cir. 1990); Marsee v. United States
Tobacco Co., 866 F.2d 319, 323-24 (10th Cir. 1989); Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
847 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1988). See Carlson, Policing, supra note 4, at 584 n.25 (citing
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Consistent with the theme of this article, the direction of the foregoing
decisions should be followed and expanded upon. An exclusionary
posture represents correct application of policy and law. Hearsay reports
of nontestifying experts do not belong in a case's body of proof as
substantive evidence.
III. ILLUSTRATING THE BASES
The last section of this article rejected from affirmative proof the
inadmissible basis used by an expert to reach an opinion. Nor are those
bases properly usable to "illustrate" the basis for the expert's conclusion.
Sometimes lawyers argue that jurors should hear inadmissible evidence
so that they can better assess the quality of the expert's opinion. The
danger of misuse is too high. The argument should be resisted.
Recent human behavior research supports this conclusion. Participants in an experiment were exposed to unsubstantiated and secondhand information conveyed by means of an expert relating his background investigations to the jury. Mock juror simulations indicated that
expert background hearsay was used to reach verdict decisions, in spite
of judicial instructions to ignore the substantive facts asserted in the
hearsay statements."6 The results underline the need to reject the
position of some courts. These courts admit hearsay information
conveyed by an expert as long as the jury is instructed to ignore the
facts asserted in the hearsay statement and use the information only for
determining the weight to attribute to the expert's opinion." In her
research on expert hearsay, Regina Schuller addressed prior studies
"which have focused on hearsay conveyed via a nonexpert witness.""5
Some of these have suggested that mock jurors' decisions are only
minimally influenced by hearsay information. 9 How is the difference
in result explained when an expert conveys the hearsay? Schuller raises
the possibility that hearsay transmitted by an expert, as opposed to a lay
witness, may carry convincing weight.'0
The oft-expressed concern that expert testimony will be overvalued by
the jurors because of its "aura of scientific reliability and trustworthiness" (see Vidmar & Schuller, 1989) suggests that hearsay conveyed

additional cases).
16. Regina A. Schuller, Expert Eoidence and Hearsay,19 LAw & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 345
(1995).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Madrid, 673 F.2d 1114, 1118 n.4 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 843 (1982).
18. Schuller, supra note 16, at 348 (emphasis added).

19. Id.
20. Id. at 348-49.
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via an expert, as opposed to a nonexpert witness, may carry greater
weight. The "paramessage" elements, such as prestige and expertise,
that accompany the expert's "message" (Rosenthal, 1983) may lend
greater credibility to the hearsay information.2
Will limiting instructions take care of the problem? Further studies
tend to suggest that instructions can have just the opposite effect.
"Taken in their entirety, these findings tend to suggest that the
introduction of limiting instructions regarding hearsay information
conveyed via expert testimony may either have little or no effect, or
alternatively, may even backfire and enhance the impact of the hearsay
information ... "22
In the Schuller study, "the secondhand information introduced via
expert testimony was not independently admitted at trial." 3 The
judge's final charge instructed the jury that these facts were not to be
accepted as true unless established by other evidence presented at
trial.' "Contrary to the research exploring juror sensitivity to hearsay
conveyed via nonexpert witnesses, in the present study hearsay
information conveyed via an expert witness did influence the decision
process."25
Schuller readily concedes that this 1995 study is "subject to the usual
limitations of juror simulations," and the author cites the need for
continued research.2' At the least, however, there is very little reason
to back away from longstanding positions as a result of these most
recent experimental findings.
Limiting instructions do not seem to prevent jurors from using
inadmissible hearsay for the truth of the hearsay assertions and may
even highlight the inadmisisble material. Imwinkelried has long been
skeptical of the use of judicial instructions as a panacea for policing
expert hearsay.2 7 So has this author.' When the debate about expert
underlying data began in earnest in 1984, its beginning was marked by
a critique of jury instructions. Targeted were those admonitions by the
trial court instructing the jury "to disregard the substantive effect of the
nontestifying [expert's] report" but then advising that "the evidence will

21. Id. at 349.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 351.
24. Id.
25. Id at 359.
26. Id. at 359-60.
27. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Bases of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure
of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1, 12 (1988).
28. Carlson, Getting a Grip, supra note 3, at 37.
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nevertheless come in 'simply to illustrate the basis of the expert's
opinion.'"29 The 1984 article castigated this sort of limiting instructions.3" "The weakness of this rationalization for courtroom reference
to third party reports and conclusions, however, is clear."3' Supporting
reasons were supplied:
[C]ivil litigants may argue that an out-of-court report should be
admitted as an adjunct of the direct examination "simply to illustrate
the basis for the expert's opinion, not as substantive evidence." The
distinction will likely escape the jury, and the subterfuge should not be
allowed to frustrate accepted hearsay policies. As in certain other
areas of evidence law, it would be mythical to expect the jury simply
to consider
its illustrative effect and disregard its substantive
32
content.
The point has been reiterated on subsequent occasions," leading to
this conclusion: Underlying expert data must be independently
admissible in order to be heard in full upon direct examination, and this
principle applies whether the proponent offers details of the data as
substantive evidence or simply to explain the basis for the expert's
opinion. While this should provide the general approach, compelling
circumstances may from time to time vary application of the rule of
exclusion.3 4
IV. COMMENTATOR REACTIONS

The subject of this article has stirred productive reactions from a
number of learned observers including, but not limited to, Imwinkelried,
Epps, Rice, Lempert, Allen, Miller, and others. A recent Comment
rehearses a number of current theories and posits a series of productive
conclusions.3 5 The author first recognizes that some authorities claim

29. Ronald L. Carlson, CollisionCourse in Expert Testimony:LimitationsonAffirmative
Introduction of UnderlyingData, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 234, 244-45 (1984).
30. Id. at 245.
31. Id.

32. Id. at 245 n.44. Jury instructions can be highly effective in turning jurors away
from improper practices in a number of contexts, but this area may not be one of them.
33. Ronald L. Carlson, In Defense of a Constitutional Theory of Experts, 87 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1182 (1993) [hereinafter Carlson, In Defense]; Carlson, Getting a Grip, supra note 3,

at 38.
34. An escape clause appears in MINN. R. EVID. 703(b) barring an expert's hearsay
basis generally but allowing in civil cases some judicial discretion to admit when good
cause is shown and the underlying data is particularly trustworthy. The author of this
article has proposed a similar provision. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
35. See generally Roberta N. Buratti, Comment, What is the Status of 'Inadmissible'
Bases of Expert Testimony?, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 531 (1994). The author adverts to the
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that full disclosure of the underlying data under Federal Rule of
Evidence 703 is appropriate, then answers:
Rule 703 is not, however, a hearsay exception. First, if the advisory
committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence had intended the inadmissible bases of expert testimony to be hearsay exceptions, the exceptions
would appear in Article VIII along with the other hearsay exceptions.
Second, permitting full disclosure of an expert's underlying inadmissible bases could lead to serious abuse, especially in jurisdictions
applying a liberal view of reasonable reliance. The underlying data, if
inadmissible, does not provide the guarantees of trustworthiness
present in the exceptions to the hearsay rule. The bases for an expert's
testimony are very likely to be controlled by the party employing the
expert, hardly an unbiased source."
The author is also wary of limiting instructions as the remedy to
protect against misuse of expert hearsay. There is apparent agreement
with the view of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals which "recognizes that
limiting instructions are not effective in preventing juries from using the
underlying inadmissible data for substantive purposes." 7
Finally, the Comment distinguishes between "bedrock hearsay" and
case specific hearsay.3 8 The former includes the common knowledge of
experts in the field.39 On the other hand, case specific hearsay relates
directly to the facts of the particular case. 40 This might occur as when
the courtroom expert collects reports from others about matters in
litigation.
Trial courts should not permit full disclosure of this form of hearsay.
Since limiting instructions are generally ineffective under these
circumstances, it is this type of hearsay that poses the greatest danger
of unfair prejudice if inadmissible evidence is presented to the jury.
Therefore, trial courts must exercise scrutiny in deciding whether to

potential for abuse when courts embrace a wide-open approach to entry of expert hearsay.
For other authorities concerned about the prospect of abuse, see Michael D. Wade, Counterpoint, Should Michigan Rule of Evidence 703 be Revised?, 70 MIcH. B.J. 572 (1991). The
point is illustrated in Carlson, Getting a Grip, supra note 3, at 38. For an able discussion
of the issues explored in this Article, see Peter J. Rescorl, Comment, Fed. R. Evid. 703: A
Back Door Entrancefor Hearsayand Other Inadmissible Evidence: A Time for a Change?,
63 TEMP. L. REV. 543, 545-46 (1990).
36. Buratti, supra note 35, at 540.
37. Id. at 547.
38. Id.

39. Id.
40. Id. at 548.
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give the jury any details of "case specific hearsay" that forms the basis
for an expert's opinion.41

Imwinkelried's thinking is consistent with this general thrust. While
an expert should have free license to explain the general scientific
theories she relies upon, reports by other technicians from distant offices
about the instant case are the sort of case specific materials which are
particularly subject to exclusion. 42 Imwinkelried's conclusion is sound
when he says that judicial power should not be constricted in favor of
trial by expert. 43 The expert's proponent does not have an absolute
right to elicit a detailed description of technically inadmissible information upon which the expert opts to rely." There is merit in Imwinkelried's observation that allowing experts to refer to corroborative opinions
of other experts impinges upon the jury's power to pass on the reliability
of expert evidence.4" When a lawyer uses the testifying expert as a
conduit for the opinions of out-of-court witnesses, the process denies the
jury the right to see and assess the credibility of a faceless declarant.
V. GEORGIA APPLICATIONS

A.

The Hearsay Controversy
Two principles of evidence law seem to be evolving as expert witness
practice receives scrutiny from the appellate courts. First, an expert
may state her opinion in a Georgia courtroom, even if the opinion is
partly based upon out-of-court declarations of uncalled witnesses.4
The courtroom conclusions of such an expert are not to be defeated by
this sort of challenge: "Objection; opinion based upon hearsay." Next,
what about the subsequent admissibility of the supportive out-of-court
material? This might occur by way of either a detailed delineation from
the testifying expert about the contents of hearsay reports she received
or from reception of them as written exhibits. Georgia law seems
abundantly clear that these underlying hearsay reports are barred from
evidence by the hearsay rule.47
The twin propositions just propounded are not contradictory. As has
been explained here and in other writings, inadmissible data which

41. Id. Professor Daniel Blinks is identified as the author of the distinction between
"bedrock" hearsay versus the inadmissible case specific kind.
42. Imwinkelried, Developing, supra note 4, at 479.
43. Id.
44. ld.
45. Id.
46. See infra note 55; Orkin Co. v. Macintosh, 215 Ga. App. 587,452 S.E.2d 159 (1994).
47. Coastal Health Servs., Inc. v. Rozier, 176 Ga. App. 240, 335 S.E.2d 712 (1985).
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supports an expert may be referred to in a cursory fashion on direct
examination. " However, that does not automatically transport into
evidence the documentary or oral hearsay reports upon which an expert
elects to rely. Nor does it render the hearsay material competent to

explain or illustrate the expert's opinion, at least on direct examination.49

Commentators like Milich have traced the course of Georgia law. In
his 1995 treatise, Milich notes that while Georgia practice is in flux as

to the first point mentioned in the foregoing paragraph of this Article,
it seems clear that "an expert's opinion is not always prohibited simply
because it is based in part on hearsay that is not otherwise before the
court .... .50
Recent cases confirm this approach. Consider this
declaration from WMI Urban Services, Inc. v. Erwin:5 "[An expert
may state his opinion ... even if the opinion is based in part on
hearsay.""2 Other decisions are in accord,' prompting this passage
contained in Agnor's Georgia Evidence: "There is a trend that seems to
permit an expert to base his opinion on hearsay."'
What about the second proposition, that relating to admission or
exclusion of the expert's underlying hearsay data? Milich comments that
"any writings containing the opinions of witness[es] who will not testify
are inadmissible, even if the testifying expert relied upon them in

48. See Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts:
Deference or Education?,87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1131, 1134 (1993); Richard Lempert, Experts,
Stories, and Information, 87 Nw. U: L. REV. 1169, 1180 (1993).
49. See Carlson, In Defense, supra note 33, at 1183 n.4, 8. On cross-examination things
are different. The cross-examiner is usually enitled to delve into the details of the hearsay
report subject to the proponent bringing out related portions on redirect. See MINN. R.
EVID. 703(b); People v. Campos, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113 (1995); Liles v. Employers Mutual
Ins., 377 N.W.2d 214 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985). In Georgia, a contrary approach may prevail.
See Stouffer Corp. v. Henkel, 170 Ga. App. 383, 317 S.E.2d 222 (1984).
50. PAUL S. MILICH, GEORGIA RULEs OF EVIDENCE 224 (1995). Milich makes the point
elsewhere in his treatise that on direct examination an expert will normally supply the
reasons for her opinion and in the typical case that may proceed without incident. Id. at
225. However, where a significant part of the expert's conclusions are drawn from hearsay
reports, the dichotomy set forth in this article operates. The expert may identify hearsay
reports as a contributing source, but may not read or recite their contents to the jury.
Frequently the reports of out-of-court experts are full of case specific opinions and
conclusions.
51. 215 Ga. App. 357, 450 S.E.2d 830 (1994).
52. Id. at 358, 450 S.E.2d at 831. Compare Loper v. Drury, 211 Ga. App. 478, 440
S.E.2d 32 (1993).
53. Blackburn v. State, 180 Ga. App. 436, 349 S.E.2d 286 (1986).
54. D. LAKE RUMSEY, JR., AGNOR'S GEORGIA EVIDENCE 223 n.5 (3d ed. 1993). This text
notes that, in addition to this general trend, this has been the rule over many years for
experts on market value as well as those on mental condition. Id. at 230, 234.
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forming his opinion. "
Distinctions need to be made among general
scientific theories in the expert's field, knowledge acquired within the
scope of a person's profession,"6 and case specific reports. The latter
are subject to challenge. When these reports come from nontestifying
experts and contain conclusions of uncalled witnesses, their exclusion is
commanded by the hearsay rule. It makes little difference whether the
hearsay is offered as substantive evidence for proof of its truth or only
to explain the expert's opinion."
Not all Georgia cases have been expansive in their examination of
these issues. When factual patterns have presented opportunities for
clarification of the law, courts have not always explored the conflicting
positions which are competing for judicial attention. In Brinks, Inc. v.
Robinson, s the appellate court approved introduction of clinical records
containing notes of a specialist who did not testify at trial. 9 Recognition of the debate over the propriety of so doing is not signalled by the
court."° In other cases, however, Georgia decisions have held that no
rule of law mandates the admission of hearsay simply because a

55. MILICH, supra note 50, at 226 n.13 (citing Stoneridge Prop., Inc. v. Kuper, 178 Ga.
App. 409, 343 S.E.2d 424 (1986)), In a case which recognizes the dichotomy discussed in
this Article, the statement by Milich is supported by Blackburn v. State, 180 Ga. App. 436,
437,349 S.E.2d 286,288 (1986) (witness stated his opinion was based partly on statements
he received, and this was approved because "he did not repeat those statements").
Exclusionary decisions do not usually distinguish between hearsay admitted to explain the
expert's opinion versus hearsay admitted as substantive evidence. Under either theory,
the hearsay is excluded. See Coastal Health Servs., Inc. v. Rozier, 176 Ga. App. 240, 335
S.E.2d 712 (1985) (ombudsman report); Weksler v. Weksler, 173 Ga. App. 250, 325 S.E.2d
874 (1985); Giles v. Taylor, 166 Ga. App. 563, 305 S.E.2d 154 (1983). This is as it should
be. See supranote 16 and accompanying text. Of course, where the reports of third parties
not before the court are shown to come within a hearsay exception and a proper foundation
is laid, they are admissible.
56. MILICH, supra note 50, at 223.
57. An objection to the hearsay should be sustained in both cases. See supra note 16
and accompanying text; see also supra note 55.
58. 215 Ga. App. 865, 452 S.E.2d 788 (1994).
59. Id. at 868, 452 S.E.2d at 791.
60. Admission of the notes of a physical therapist may have been error, in the view of
the court, but it was harmless. "At worst the [physical theiapist's] reports were merely
cumulative and any error in admitting them was harmless." Id at 868-69, 452 S.E.2d at
791. See supra note 55 (citing Georgia decisions disapproving backdoor hearsay). In
Brinks the lack of expansive discussion of the expert hearsay issue may be understandable
in view of other things demanding the court's attention. The court seems to have been
concentrating on joinder issues. There was a concurring opinion which discussed joinder
of parties as well as a dissent, and the court of appeals ultimately reversed the judgment
below on misjoinder grounds.
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testifying physician predicated opinions upon other nontestifying doctors'
reports.6 1
B.

JudicialCuriosity About an Expert's Foundation

When the courtroom expert relies on unadmitted data, the trial judge
must decide whether this data is of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the field. Only with this sort of foundation can the expert
then proceed to propound scientific conclusions. How can counsel
convince the judge to make an affirmative decision about allowing the
expert's testimony? One way is to ask the witness whether other similar
experts place reasonable reliance on the kind of material upon which the
courtroom expert relied. A positive response moves the court toward
introduction of the expert's opinion. At this point several courts impose
a requirement that the trial judge make an independent assessment of
the quality of the expert's underlying data. 2 Only after a finding that
it is reliable can expert testimony be permitted. The trial judge must
independently assess the reasonableness of relying on hearsay.
Imwinkelried describes this as the majority view in the United
States."3 The decision by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc."4 gave a boost to this position in
federal courts. "Daubert contains a general mandate that judges
[actively] police or screen the reliability of scientific testimony. "
"Georgia cases allowing an expert to express an opinion based on
hearsay have not required that the hearsay be of the type 'reasonably
relied upon' by experts in the particular field .... ." However, Milich
sees that principle as a coming feature of Georgia law: "[It is likely
Georgia courts will eventually employ such a requirement."67 As local
courts move to align state law with Federal Rule of Evidence 703, the
judicial obligation to assure that the jury is exposed only to scientific
evidence which is reliable increases.

61. Stouffer Corp. v. Henkel, 170 Ga. App. 383, 317 S.E.2d 222 (1984). See Sticher v.
State, 209 Ga. App. 423,433 S.E.2d 660 (1993); Department of Human Resources v. Corbin,

202 Ga. App. 10, 413 S.E.2d 484 (1991) (when lab report relied on by expert contains
opinions of third party, those portions of report are inadmissible hearsay).
62. Ronald L. Carlson, Experts as Hearsay Conduits:ConfrontationAbuses in Opinion

Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 859, 872-73 (1992).
63. Imwinkelried, Developing, supra note 4, at 29.
64. 506 U.S. 914 (1993).
65. Imwinkelried, Developing, supra note 4, at 24.
66.

67.

MILICH, supra note 50, at 221.
MILICH, supra note 50, at 222.
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C. Clarification
The sometimes uncertain posture of Georgia law suggests the need for
statutory or rule enactment to guide judicial decisions. Current Federal
Rule of Evidence 703 provides a worthwhile starting point. Adding a
second provision to it in the pattern of Louisiana or Minnesota law
would provide the requisite clarification.6 A working draft for the
additional provision might read something like this:
In criminal cases, and generally in civil cases, underlying expert data
must be independently admissible in order to be received upon direct
examination. An expert's reliance on unadmitted data does not alone
authorize introduction of the data. When good cause is shown in civil
cases and the underlying information is particularly trustworthy, the
court may admit the data under this rule to illustrate the basis for the
expert's opinion. Nothing in this rule restricts admissibility of underlying expert data when inquired into on cross-examination.
The third sentence of this provision is not an invitation to trial judges
to routinely admit case specific hearsay, 9 which is the sort of hearsay
targeted by this proposal. Rather, the good cause exception is limited to
compelling cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because of the proliferation of technical witnesses, courts should
actively police the bases of modern expert testimony. With traditional
sorts of experts who base their opinions largely upon personal knowledge
or facts admitted at trial, little problem exists. But in a complex society
where information comes from numerous sources and locations,
difficulties increase. That which experts base their opinions upon can
be flawed. The solution is for the trial judge, before testimony, to assess
the reliability of the material upon which the expert relied. 70 As noted,
with "ordinary" experts this review will often be cursory, but in areas of
novel expert opinions it might be exhaustive. If the underlying data
used by the expert is unreliable or contrived, the expert's opinions
should be rejected as a matter of law.
On the other hand, many experts will testify based on solid information, even if that information is technically inadmissible under the

68. See supra notes 12 and 14.

69. The distinction between expert theories and general scientific background material
versus case specific reports is discussed at numerous points in this Article. See supra note

34 and accompanying text.
70. Carlson, supra note 62, at 872.
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formal rules of evidence. This Article has addressed the issue of whether
this underlying data becomes affirmative evidence in its own right;
hearsay documents which are unauthenticated, save for reference to
them by a courtroom expert, do not. The question of whether a
courtroom expert's reliance on case specific reports of others automatically renders them admissible is easily answered. The answer is no. This
observation applies with particular force to outside reports containing
conclusions about the specific case in litigation. While the expert may
use them to prepare her courtroom opinions, the hearsay rule bars
detailed rendition of their contents or reception as exhibits unless they
are traditionally authenticated. In criminal cases, the Confrontation
Clause of the United States Constitution does the same.7'

71.

Carlson, In Defense, supra note 33, at 1182; Epps, supra note 2, at 64 n.52.

